HardScope: Thwarting DOP with Hardware-assisted Run-time Scope
  Enforcement by Nyman, Thomas et al.
HardScope: Thwarting DOP attacks with Hardware-assisted
Run-time Scope Enforcement
Thomas Nyman
Aalto University, Finland
thomas.nyman@aalto.fi
Ghada Dessouky
Technische Universität Darmstadt,
Germany
ghada.dessouky@trust.tu-darmstadt.
de
Shaza Zeitouni
Technische Universität Darmstadt,
Germany
shaza.zeitouni@trust.tu-darmstadt.de
Aaro Lehikoinen
Aalto University, Finland
aaro.j.lehikoinen@aalto.fi
Andrew Paverd
Aalto University, Finland
andrew.paverd@ieee.org
N. Asokan
Aalto University, Finland
asokan@acm.org
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Technische Universität Darmstadt,
Germany
ahmad.sadeghi@trust.tu-darmstadt.de
ABSTRACT
Widespread use of memory unsafe programming languages (e.g., C
and C++) leaves many systems vulnerable to memory corruption
attacks. A variety of defenses have been proposed to mitigate attacks
that exploit memory errors to hijack the control flow of the code
at run-time, e.g., (fine-grained) randomization or Control Flow In-
tegrity. However, recent work on data-oriented programming (DOP)
demonstrated highly expressive (Turing-complete) attacks, even in
the presence of these state-of-the-art defenses. Although multiple
real-world DOP attacks have been demonstrated, no efficient de-
fenses are yet available. We propose run-time scope enforcement
(RSE), a novel approach designed to efficiently mitigate all currently
known DOP attacks by enforcing compile-time memory safety con-
straints (e.g., variable visibility rules) at run-time. We present Hard-
Scope, a proof-of-concept implementation of hardware-assisted
RSE for the new RISC-V open instruction set architecture. We
discuss our systematic empirical evaluation of HardScope which
demonstrates that it can mitigate all currently known DOP attacks,
and has a real-world performance overhead of 3.2% in embedded
benchmarks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Although known for over two decades, memory corruption vul-
nerabilities are still a persistent source of threats against software
systems. The main problem is that modern software still contains a
lot of unsafe code written in memory unsafe programming languages
(e.g., C and C++), especially in embedded systems and the Internet
of Things [15]. The lack of memory safety in these languages and
the inevitability of software bugs leave many systems vulnerable to
attacks that exploit memory errors.
Control-flow attacks, such as Return-Oriented Programming
(ROP) [32], which hijack the execution flow of a program, are
well-known, and various defenses against them have been proposed
(e.g., [1, 21, 23]). In contrast, non-control-data attacks do not need
to modify the control-flow, and thus cannot be prevented by these
defenses. Instead, non-control-data attacks corrupt data used for
decision-making, e.g., to leak sensitive data or escalate privileges by
corrupting variables used in authorization decisions. Some defenses
against non-control-data attacks (e.g., [8, 30]) provide protection
against attacks that only target individual pieces of (security-critical)
data.
However, recent work has shown that non-control-data attacks
can be generalized to achieve Turing-complete execution, called
Data-Orientated Programming (DOP) [17]. In DOP, the attacker
carefully corrupts non-control-data to build up sequences of oper-
ations (data-oriented gadgets) without modifying the program’s
control-flow. Each gadget simulates a virtual operation on some
attacker-controlled input. Unlike previous non-control-data attacks,
DOP can be highly expressive (e.g., including assignment, arithmetic,
and conditional decisions). This allows DOP to actively break state-
of-the-art defenses, such as Address Space Layout Randomization
(ASLR) [23]. Since DOP can reuse virtually any data, preventing
DOP is a significant challenge.
Practical DOP attacks have already been shown against real-world
software [14, 17]. Hu et al. [17] discuss various existing schemes
that could reduce the number of DOP attacks, including memory
safety, data-flow integrity, fine-grained data-plane randomization,
and hardware/software fault isolation. However, they explain that
mitigating DOP with existing approaches results in high perfor-
mance overheads, and do not offer viable alternatives. As defenses
against control-flow attacks become widespread [19], DOP is likely
to become the next appealing attack technique for modern run-time
exploitation.
Goals and Contributions. We propose a new efficient defense
against non-control-data attacks and all currently known DOP at-
tacks. The intuition behind our approach is simple: In block struc-
tured languages, such as C and C++, every variable has a so-called
lexical scope, denoting the block(s) of source code in which the
variable is visible. Developers can thus define variables with lim-
ited scope of visibility (e.g., local variables). All correct compilers
enforce variable scope at compile-time by checking these variable
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visibility rules. However, all currently known DOP attacks violate
variable scope rules at run-time, since there is no equivalent enforce-
ment. Consequently, mechanisms for variable scope enforcement
at run-time can significantly reduce the number of available DOP
gadgets.
In this paper, we define the notion of Run-time Scope Enforce-
ment (RSE) that provides fine-grained compartmentalization of data
memory within programs. We demonstrate that RSE can mitigate all
currently known DOP attacks. We stress that while it is not possible
to guarantee the absence of DOP gadgets in arbitrary programs1
we argue that RSE can prevent DOP in typical programs. Unlike
RSE, existing defences (a) do not provide complete mediation of
all variable accesses [17] (as we explain in Section 7) and (b) suffer
from high performance and memory overhead [7, 25, 26].
We then describe HardScope, a hardware-assisted RSE scheme.
HardScope introduces a set of six new instructions. Compiler-
assisted instrumentation places HardScope instructions in the pro-
gram to ensure that all memory access constraints are also enforced
at run-time. As the program executes, these instructions dynamically
create rules that define which code blocks can access which pieces of
memory. One significant challenge is to minimize the performance
overhead of checking these rules on every memory load/store opera-
tion. To overcome this challenge, we designed an efficient method
for storing the rules as a stack, such that all rules applicable to the
currently executing code block are always at the top of the stack and
can be checked simultaneously (Section 5).
Since enforcement rules are created and updated dynami-
cally,HardScope (or any other RSE scheme) enables context-
specific memory isolation, unlike prior defenses that only allow
static policies [3, 5–7, 13, 35]. This means that the same piece of
code can be granted access to different memory locations depend-
ing on the context in which the code is executed. For example, if
a particular function can be called as part of either a privileged or
unprivileged execution path, HardScope can allow/deny it access
to certain variables in memory depending on which path was ex-
ecuted.2 This is critical to reducing the number of available DOP
gadgets. In Section 5.2 we describe how HardScope can enforce
memory protection at either coarser or finer granularity. RSE can be
instantiated with HardScope to enforce various protection models,
such as defending against ROP attacks by protecting function return
addresses on the stack.
We developed a proof-of-concept implementation of HardScope
targeting the RISC-V instruction set architecture. We integrated
HardScope with the open-source Pulpino core3 on a Zedboard
FPGA4 (Section 5). We also added support for HardScope to the
RISC-V toolchain and enhanced the RISC-V compiler to automati-
cally instrument programs to protect variables at run-time to mitigate
known DOP attacks. Finally, we extended the official RISC-V simu-
lator, Spike, to support our new instructions. Our evaluation indicates
that HardScope is efficient enough to be realized even on small
embedded devices.
1A pathological case would be a program that contains all necessary gadgets, a gadget
dispatcher, and all the data in the same function.
2RSE can in fact enforce different policies on each distinct invocation of a given function
even in a single execution path.
3http://www.pulp-platform.org/
4http://zedboard.org/
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
∙ Run-time Scope Enforcement: A novel approach for fine-
grained context-specific memory isolation within pro-
grams (Section 4) to defeat non-control-data attacks, and
all currently known DOP attacks.
∙ HardScope: An open-source proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of hardware-assisted runtime scope enforcement on
the RISC-V instruction set architecture to achieve efficient
compartmentalization of memory accesses within pro-
grams capable of mitigating all currently known DOP at-
tacks (Section 5).
∙ Automatic Instrumentation: Compiler support for protect-
ing large classes of variables at run-time without requir-
ing any developer input or data-flow analysis (Section 5.2).
∙ Evaluation: Systematic analyses of how HardScope mit-
igates published DOP attacks (Section 6.1), discussion of
RSE security guarantees (Section 6.2), and evaluation of
HardScope’s hardware area overhead and performance im-
pact (Section 6.3). HardScope is efficient, incurring only
a 3.2% performance overhead in embedded benchmarks.
Code Availability. To enable our results to be reproduced, and to
encourage further research in this area, the source code for the
HardScope-enhanced GCC toolchain including the RISC-V simu-
lator are available in the accompanying supplementary material at
https://goo.gl/TAjLxy.
2 BACKGROUND
Memory errors and bounds checking. Exploitable memory errors
may be used as entry-points to a vulnerable program. These may
provide read or write access to program memory. At run-time, C
and C++ programs can access or overwrite data anywhere in their
own memory space. Modern compilers may insert checks around
operations on local, global, and heap objects (e.g., arrays), that
verify at run-time whether data written to a memory object is within
the boundaries of that object. Such bounds checking can prevent
buffer overflows, but requires instrumentation of code and incurs
high performance and memory overhead [31], even with hardware
support for such bounds checks [28]5.
Existing defenses. Modern systems prevent direct modification
of program code by W⊕X memory access policies such as Data
Execution Prevention [16], use control-flow integrity [1, 19] to deter
control-flow attacks that do not modify program code and raise the
bar against run-time attacks using Address Space Layout Random-
ization (ASLR) [23].
W⊕X. An attacker can use memory vulnerabilities to subvert
the integrity of the program memory. Direct modification of pro-
gram code in modern processors is prevented by W⊕X memory
access policies such as Data Execution Prevention [16]. Probabilis-
tic defenses. In sophisticated run-time attacks, the attacker crafts
payloads that cause the program to behave in an unintended manner.
These payloads usually refer to data and code by their addresses
in memory. Attackers can find these addresses by offline analysis
5Major compiler collections, such as GCC and LLVM, already support run-time
bounds checks using AddressSanitizer [31] and Intel’s Memory Protection Extensions
(MPX) [28].
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of the program memory layout. Address Space Layout Randomiza-
tion (ASLR) [23] randomizes the memory layout of the program
on each execution. ASLR typically randomizes the base address of
the executable and the positions of the stack, heap, and libraries.
This prevents an attacker from reliably addressing known targets, for
instance identifying a particular function to jump to, or reading/mod-
ifying a particular variable. However, ASLR defenses are susceptible
to information leakage (e.g., by obtaining the value of a well-known
pointer), and are routinely bypassed in real-world exploits [33].
Data-Orientated Programming. In DOP [17], an attacker care-
fully tampers with non-control-data to execute sequences of opera-
tions within the program on attacker-controlled input. Each sequence
of operations constitutes a data-oriented gadget which represents a
single virtual machine instruction executing on top of benign pro-
gram logic. A gadget dispatcher (e.g., an attacker-controlled loop
in the benign program) enables the attacker to chain together data-
orientated gadgets to realize expressive computation.
Hu et al. [17] demonstrate three practical DOP attacks against
the ProFTPD file server and one DOP attack against the Wireshark
network packet analyzer. In the following, we describe the first attack
against ProFTPD in detail. The remaining DOP attacks described
by Hu et al. and an independently discovered attack by Evans [14]
against the GStreamer FLIC decoder are described in Appendix C.
Each attack against ProFTPD exploits the same stack buffer over-
flow vulnerability in a general-purpose string replacement function,
sreplace()6 allowing the attacker to read and write arbitrary
memory locations (as shown in Appendix A). The attacker’s goal
is to obtain the server’s OpenSSL private key, but the memory
address of this key is randomized by the program. The attacker
constructs a virtual DOP program that accesses the OpenSSL
context structure (ssl_ctx) from a well-known location in
memory, then dereferences a chain of pointers to determine the key’s
location. The attack requires three different data-oriented gadgets:
assignment, addition, and pointer dereferencing. The assignment
gadget is constructed from the vulnerable sreplace() function.
The addition gadget is realized by corrupting two integer fields
in a global data structure, session.total_bytes_out
and session.xfer.total_out, and performs
the operation session.total_bytes_out +=
session.xfer.total_out. The dereference gadget is
obtained by corrupting a string pointer in another global data
structure, main_server.ServerName. This dereferences the
pointer main_server->ServerName and copies the result
to a known position in a static buffer. These gadgets can be
triggered in arbitrary sequences using specially crafted input without
compromising the control-flow of ProFTPD. Note that during
benign execution, sreplace() need not access ssl_ctx, nor
any of the nested structures that lead to the key, nor the key itself.
In Section 6.1 we demonstrate how enforcing RSE in ProFTPD
thwarts this attack.
3 REQUIREMENTS & ASSUMPTIONS
Adversary Model. We consider a powerful adversary who has full
control over the data memory of the target program. This models
buffer overflows and other memory corruption vulnerabilities (e.g.,
6CVE-2006-5815: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2006-5815
an externally controlled format string7) that could lead to arbitrary
corruption of data memory. However, the adversary cannot modify
program code at run-time (W⊕X protection). Our adversary model is
standard for runtime attacks and consistent with the adversary in Hu
et al.’s DOP attacks against ProFTPD (Section 2 and Appendix C).
Requirements. We require a mechanism that prevents the above
adversary from mounting DOP attacks. Since DOP attacks require
the adversary to modify data in unintended ways at run-time, these
attacks can be prevented by a run-time enforcement mechanism that
prevents any modification of control-data and non-control-data that
would not be permitted during a compile-time check by a correct
compiler. We derive the following requirements for a mechanism
that mitigates all currently known DOP attacks.
R1. Multi-granularity enforcement. Enforce memory protection
at run-time for any granularity of protection domain (subject) and
protected region (object).
R2. Context-specific enforcement. Enforce different permissions
on each invocation of the same subject (e.g., each function), to
minimize the attack surface following the principle of least privilege.
R3. Complete mediation. Protection domains cannot increase their
permissions accidentally or maliciously, and all memory accesses
can be checked with only minimal performance impact and memory
overhead.
Design goals. We define two design goals for the system:
∙ Legacy software should run without recompilation even if
selected components, such as libraries, make use of fine-
grained protection.
∙ Performance and memory overhead should scale gracefully
with the number of protection domains (subjects), the num-
ber of protected regions (objects), and the frequency of
domain transitions.
Assumptions. In our implementation of RSE we make the following
assumptions:
∙ We restrict our attention to single-threaded C programs. We
outline what would be needed to relax this assumption in
Appendix F.
∙ Typical programs minimize the scope of variables and
interdependence between modules, e.g., local and static
variables are preferred over global variables. We discuss
narrowing the run-time visibility of global variables in Sec-
tion 5.2.
∙ Typical programs enhance spatial locality by nesting struc-
tures instead of creating links between separate structures
by nesting pointers. This is reasonable to assume because
it improves performance by making better use of proces-
sor caches, and may also improve power consumption in
embedded applications [18]. Nevertheless, we also discuss
how RSE can be applied to nested pointers in Section 5.2.
∙ We focus on an adversary that employs DOP and other
non-control-data attacks. A real-world adversary may also
attempt to influence a program’s control flow. Defenses
against control-flow attacks, such as Control-Flow Integrity
(CFI) [1] are complementary to RSE. In Appendix E we
7CWE-134: Use of Externally-Controlled Format String https://cwe.mitre.org/data/
definitions/134.html
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show how applying RSE at a suitable granularity can also
prevent large classes of control-flow attacks, e.g., ROP.
4 DESIGN OVERVIEW
Designing a solution to meet the requirements identified in Section 3
requires addressing two major challenges:
(1) Run-time enforcement: enforcing variable scopes at run-
time requires information which is usually only available
at compile-time (necessary to meet R1).
(2) Context-specific enforcement: enforcing different rules for
each invocation of a code block requires rules to be created,
modified, and deleted dynamically at run-time (necessary
to meet R2).
R3 implies that solutions to these challenges must be efficient. The
high-level idea of HardScope is to extend the compiler to emit
compile-time information about the visibility of variables, and to
extend the underlying hardware to use this compiler-supplied infor-
mation to dynamically create and update a set of memory access
rules against which all memory accesses are checked. We chose
function-level compartmentalization as the granularity of isolation,
since this is sufficient to mitigate all currently known DOP attacks
(Section 6.1, Appendix C). However, RSE can also be implemented
at other granularities, without changes to the new HardScope hard-
ware as described in Section 6.2 and Appendix E.
Run-time enforcement. Binary program code produced from
languages such as C and C++ does not include information available
to the compiler about variables and code blocks. RSE needs this
information to assign in-memory variables to specific execution
contexts. To bridge this gap between compile-time lexical scope and
run-time execution context, we modified the compiler to instrument
the program code with special instructions that record the variables
that may be used by each block of code. HardScope introduces an
instruction set extension for this purpose (Section 5.1).
The compile-time components and behavior of HardScope are
illustrated in Figure 1. An unmodified source code program (❶) is
fed to the compiler (❷), which checks that all variable accesses are
correctly scoped (as usual). Our new RSE Plug-in (❸) in the compiler
adds HardScope instructions (❹) at particular locations in the bi-
nary (e.g., at the start of functions). This results in a fully-functional
program binary, instrumented with HardScope instructions. These
instructions are used by the HardScope hardware to create a set of
rules against which all memory accesses can be checked at run-time.
Context-specific enforcement. Consider the program (❶) in Fig-
ure 1: function C receives two pointers as input and copies data from
the first pointer to the second. It can be called from either function
A or function B (the call graph is shown in Figure 2). In benign
program execution, variables x and y are only used in a privileged
execution path, where access control checks prevent their misuse
(e.g., 𝑥 could be a secret key). Function B contains an exploitable
vulnerability allowing the attacker to control the pointers passed
to function C. Since function C can be used to copy arbitrary data
between two attacker-controlled pointers, this constitutes a usable
DOP gadget. The attacker could use this to bypass the access con-
trol checks on variables x and y by accessing them through the
unprivileged execution path. To enable context-specific enforcement,
HardScope must be able to associate different memory access rules
with each active instance of a function.
To address this challenge, the HardScope hardware creates mem-
ory access rules dynamically for each individual function invocation,
and stores these in a stack data structure called the Storage Region
Stack (SRS). The SRS is kept in hardware-isolated protected mem-
ory; only HardScope instructions can add or remove SRS entries.
Each entry in the SRS defines an area of data memory (e.g., the
location of a variable) that may be accessed. The SRS is organized
into frames; each frame corresponds to an execution context (i.e.,
contains all the entries for that context). The topmost SRS frame
corresponds to the active execution context. On each memory access,
e.g., load or store, HardScope validates that the memory address
matches an entry in the topmost SRS frame.
To prevent the attack scenario in Figure 2, HardScope’s enforce-
ment of function C’s memory accesses must distinguish between
legitimate accesses to variables x and y when invoked by function
A, and illegitimate accesses to them when invoked by the exploited
function B. By default, HardScope prevents function C from ac-
cessing both x and y.
The SRS for function A (❺) includes variables x and y, and the
SRS for function B (❻) includes variables i and j (Figure 2). To
allow function C to access certain variables, the calling function
must use a special instruction (Figure 1 ❼) to delegate access to a
variable to function C: e.g., function A must delegate access to x and
y. For valid delegation, the calling function must already have access
to the delegated variables. HardScope RSE therefore prevents the
attack shown in Figure 2: even though the attacker can manipulate
the pointers in function B, this function does not have access to x
and y (its SRS lacks the corresponding entries) and hence function
B cannot delegate access to these variables to function C.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
To realize Run-time Scope Enforcement (RSE), the new instructions
must provide the following functionality:
(1) Specify what storage regions are accessible by an execution
context.
(2) Allow an execution context to dynamically delegate access
to a storage region to another execution context (e.g., during
function invocation or return).
(3) Subdivide a storage region so that partial access can be
delegated.
Section 5.1 describes the HardScope instructions in detail.
Further, the compiler needs to be modified to emit these instruc-
tions to describe visibility rules derived from the program source
code. Section 5.2 describes our compiler RSE Plug-in.
Finally, the underlying processor hardware must be extended to
efficiently store and enforce the visibility rules described by the new
instructions. Section 5.3 describes our processor modifications and
proof-of-concept hardware realization of HardScope.
5.1 HardScope Instructions
HardScope extends the RISC-V instruction set with six new SRS
management instructions, as shown in Table 1.
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Compiler
Source Code
RSE
Plug-in
privileged { 
…
call copy(ptrx, ptry)
… 
}
…
unprivileged { 
…
call copy(ptri, ptrj)
…
}
…
copy { … }
A
B
C
Executable
Program
function A 
setup SRS frame
Instruction
Instruction
setup delegates
CALL function B
...
A
C
function B 
setup SRS frame
Instruction
Instruction
setup delegates
CALL function B
...
B
C
function C 
setup SRS frame
Instruction
Instruction
...
RETURN
C
Data
x
y
i
j
❶
❷
❹
❼
❸
memory corruption vulnerability
instr new instructions added by instr. engine
Figure 1: Compile-phase design ofHardScope. Run-time mem-
ory accesses via pointers 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑥, 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑦 are limited to variables 𝑥
and 𝑦, while 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑖, 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑗 are limited to 𝑖 and 𝑗.
B CC A
x
y
SRS  A
i
j
SRS B
x
y
SRS  C SRS C
unprivileged control-flow path
privileged control-flow path
memory corruption vulnerability
corrupted pointer
C CB
❺ ❻
x
y
i
j
ptri
ptrj
x
yptrx
ptry
(a) delegation permitted (b) delegation disallowed
x y, x y,

Figure 2: Run-time design of HardScope showing the call
graph of program in Figure 1. In (a), access to variables 𝑥 and
𝑦 is successfully delegated from A to C. In (b), function B should
not have access to 𝑥 and 𝑦 (e.g., 𝑥 could be a secret key), but a
memory corruption vulnerability in B has been used to corrupt
𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑖 and 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑗 to point to 𝑥 and 𝑦 instead of 𝑖 and 𝑗. HardScope
prevents B from accessing or delegating 𝑥 and 𝑦.
The sbent and sbxit instructions are used by the compiler
RSE Plug-in to mark the beginning and end of each execution con-
text. HardScope hardware uses these instructions to track when
HardScope is first enabled and when execution context changes,
and thus when new enforcement rules should be loaded in the SRS.
When sbent is executed, a new frame is pushed on top of the
SRS. Conversely, sbxit pops the topmost SRS frame. Program
execution starts with an empty SRS and HardScope enforcement
is initially disabled. The first function that supports HardScope,
typically the program’s main function, executes sbent to enable
HardScope. HardScope remains enabled until a matching sbxit
empties the stack. Due to the associated SRS management (explained
in Section 5.3), sbent and sbxit may consume up to 𝑁 addi-
tional cycles, where 𝑁 is the number of storage region entries in the
topmost SRS frame. However, this only stalls the processor if the
instruction is followed by another sbent or sbxit within the next
𝑁 executed instructions.
The sradd and srdda instructions create a storage region en-
try (SRS entry) in the current (topmost) SRS frame. HardScope
hardware uses these instructions to determine the bounds of mem-
ory areas that the current execution context is allowed to access.
The value of the first register operand of each instruction sets the
base address, and the second operand sets the limit address. An op-
tional offset is added to to either the limit (sradd) or base (srdda)
register operand.
The srdlg and srdsub instructions delegate an SRS entry
from the currently executing function either to an invoked callee
function or to the caller when the current function returns. Hard-
Scope hardware uses these instructions to derive SRS entries for
flow of data which cannot be fully tracked by the compiler, such as
context-specific accesses (Section 4). The srdlg instruction takes a
single register operand and an immediate offset or only an immediate
operand specifying an absolute address to determine which memory
address to delegate. The resulting memory address is compared with
the entries in the current SRS frame and if a match is found, the
matching entry is copied to the next execution context entered. If
the delegation is followed by a sbent, the delegated entry is added
to the newly created SRS frame. If the delegation is followed by a
sbxit, the delegated entry is added to the caller’s SRS frame. If
multiple matching entries exist, only the most recently added entry
is delegated.
The srdsub instruction is used to delegate a new SRS entry that
is a subset of an existing SRS entry. It takes the same operands as
sradd. HardScope hardware uses the operands to decide when
storage region entries should be subdivided. If the new subdivided
memory region is a subset of an existing SRS entry in the current
SRS frame, a new SRS entry is created for a sub-region using the
new base and limit.
If no matching entry is found in the SRS when srdlg or
srdsub execute, no entry is delegated. This prevents the use of
srdsub to elevate the access rights of the next execution context
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Table 1: HardScope Instructions. Mnemonic is used to refer to
the instruction elsewhere in the paper. Name is the full name of
the instructions. Operands lists the valid combinations of operands
for each instruction: r𝑛 is a register, imm is an immediate operand,
and imm(rn) is a register to which an optional immediate value is
added as an offset. Cycles indicates the effective number of cycles
required at execute stage.
Mnemonic Name Operands Cycles
sbent scope block enter n/a 1 (+ 𝑁 )
sbxit scope block exit n/a 1 (+ 𝑁 )
sradd storage region add r1, imm(r2) 1
srdda storage region dda (reverse add) imm(r1), r2 1
srdlg storage region delegate imm(r1) 1 (+ 1)
imm
srdsub storage region delegate sub-region r1, imm(r2) 1 (+ 1)
beyond the rights of the current, but allows the delegation instruc-
tions to be applied to pointers which are not dereferenced directly
in the current context. These include null-pointers and intentionally
created out-of-scope pointers (e.g., via the use of pointer arithmetic)
that are passed to callees for which they are in scope (e.g., accessor
functions that receive opaque pointers from the caller). We refer
to this as lax delegation and describe a strict delegation variant in
Appendix D.
The srdlg and srdsub instructions each consume one addi-
tional cycle if immediately followed by context switching Hard-
Scope instructions.
5.2 RSE GCC Plug-in and Backend
We developed an enhanced version of the GCC compiler incorporat-
ing a proof-of-concept RSE GCC plug-in and a modified RISC-V
backend that can automatically instrument C programs to benefit
from HardScope without requiring any changes to program code or
additional information from the developer (e.g., code annotations).
The GCC plug-in analyzes the program’s Intermediate Represen-
tation (IR) within GCC. The plug-in targets the high-level GIMPLE
representation, which is a processor independent abstraction of the
program. From the IR, the plug-in extracts information about the use
of global and static variables in each function, the type of pointers
passed as arguments in function calls, and the return type of each
function to assess whether delegation is needed. The results of the
analysis are passed to the modified RISC-V backend that operates on
the low-level Register Transfer Language (RTL) representation of
the program and emits sequences of assembly. While the RTL lacks
information about the lexical scope of variables, the backend supple-
ments the information in the RTL with information retained from the
prior RSE plug-in analysis pass and emits HardScope instructions
when expanding function prologues, epilogues and function call
sites.
Function instrumentation. Our modified RISC-V backend cur-
rently supports automatic instrumentation of C programs at function
granularity to protect the 1) the return address and other return state
information, 2) stack variables, 3) arguments passed on the stack,
4) heap objects, and 5) global and static variables. The beginning
of each distinct execution context is marked by inserting a single
1 ; ❶ create SRS entry for local variables
2 srdda -16(sp), sp ; base=sp-16, limit=sp
3 ; ❷ create SRS entry for a global variable
4 lui t0, addi t0,t0,sradd t0, 23(t0)
5 ; ❸ standard prologue
6 addi sp,sp,-16 ; decrement stack pointer
7 sw ra,12(sp) ; store ra at sp+12
8 sw s0,8(sp) ; store s0 at sp+8
9 addi s0,sp,16 ; update frame pointer
Listing 1: Function prologue instrumentation. Registers used
are the stack pointer (sp), return address register (ra), frame
pointer (s0), and temporary register zero (t0).
sbent instruction at the function call site just before the jump in-
struction. The end of an execution context is marked by inserting
an sbxit instruction just before the return in the callee function.
In Section 6 we show that function-level isolation is sufficient to
mitigate all currently known DOP attacks. However, RSE can also
be implemented at other granularities, without changes to the new
HardScope instructions or HardScope hardware as described in
Section 6.2.
Return state and stack variables. By convention, the compiler
adds a function prologue to the beginning, and a function epilogue
to the end of each function. The function prologue is responsible
for allocating space on the call stack for local variables, and storing
the return address and old frame pointer to the stack. HardScope
instructions are inserted before the standard prologue begins in
order to create new SRS entries for local variables allocated by the
prologue, as well as for any static or global variables accessed by
the function.
Listing 1 shows a function prologue (❸) that reserves space for
a stack frame containing two 32-bit variables, the return address,
and frame pointer (16 bytes in total) from the stack (line 8). It
stores the value of the return address register (ra), and the register
holding the frame pointer (s0) to the stack frame (lines 9, 10). Our
instrumentation prepends the prologue with a srdda instruction
(❶) that adds an SRS entry covering the whole stack frame (e.g.,
16 bytes in Listing 1). The limit for this entry is one less than the
current stack pointer value, and the base address is calculated by
subtracting the size of the stack frame from the current stack pointer.
The compiler already knows the size of the stack frame since this is
used to decrement the stack pointer (line 8). The SRS entry must be
added before the standard prologue so that the prologue can access
the stack to store the return address (line 9).
Global and static variables. In C programs, global objects can
be accessed from any scope. However, RSE instrumentation can
effectively narrow the scope of global objects to only those functions
that refer directly to these objects. For example, in Listing 1, a global
myobject is accessed from the function’s scope, so an SRS entry
for myobject is created before the standard prologue begins (❷).
Separate SRS entries are added for each object accessed by the
function. The sizes of global objects are known from the IR analysis
and the address is evaluated by the linker. Static variables are handled
similarly. Conversely, functions that access global objects indirectly
(e.g., via function pointers) must receive the necessary SRS entries
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1 ; ❶ prepare arguments
2 lw a0,-12(s0) ; dest
3 add a1,s0,-1060 ; src
4 li a2,1024 ; n
5 ; ❷ setup delegations and callee srs context
6 srdlg a0 ; delegate dest
7 srdsub a1,1024(a1) ; delegate n bytes of src
8 sbent
9 ; ❸ jump to memcpy
10 jal ra,memcpy
Listing 2: Instrumented memcpy() call. dest (a0) points to a
buffer in the program’s data section. src pointer (a1) points
to a local buffer allocated from the function’s stack frame.
Integer n (a2) holds the number of bytes to copy.
1 ; ❶ prepare return value
2 lw a0,-12(s0)
3 ; ❷ delegate returned object and exit context
4 srdlg a0 ; delegate returned object
5 sbxit
6 ; ❸ return to caller
7 ret
Listing 3: Instrumented function returning a pointer via
register a0.
for these objects via run-time delegation. Without such delegated
rules HardScope would prevent access to indirectly accessed data.
Function arguments and return values. Listing 2 shows an
instrumented call to the memcpy() function in the C standard
library. The memcpy() function copies n bytes from src to dest, so
the caller prepares the arguments dest, src, and n as usual (❶). To
allow memcpy() to operate on these memory areas, two delegation
instructions are added to the program (❷) just before the call (❸).
The dest pointer is held in register a0 and points to a global buffer in
the program’s data section. The caller already has an SRS entry for
this specific buffer, which it delegates using the srdlg instruction
with register a0 (line 6).
The src buffer exists in the caller’s own stack frame. To avoid
giving memcpy() access to the caller’s whole stack frame, the
caller delegates only a sub-region spanning only the src buffer us-
ing srdsub (line 7). In this example, the programmer defined the
number of bytes to copy (n) based on the size of src. If the size of
dest is less than n, this would result in a buffer overflow, which
could be used to overwrite variables in the program’s data section.
However, since memcpy() is only delegated access to the memory
area containing dest, HardScope prevents this memory error.
Listing 3 shows an instrumented function returning a pointer (❶).
Before it returns (❸), the function delegates access to the returned
object and exits the current execution context (❷).
Heap object allocation. We implemented a wrapper on top of
the C standard library malloc() function that creates SRS entries
for the memory allocated on the heap, and delegates these to the
caller.
Deeply nested pointers. Keeping track of SRS entries is a chal-
lenge when deeply nested data structures are delegated, e.g., when
the head of a linked list is passed as an argument. Our current PoC
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Figure 3: HardScope hardware architecture. On sbent and
sbxit register banks ❸ and ❹ are exchanged.
GCC Plug-in cannot automatically infer the complete set of SRS
entries that should be delegated when a callee receives a pointer
to beginning of the nested pointer chain. Additionally, the number
of SRS entries that must be accumulated and delegated for large
nested data structures result in more frequent stalls at run-time (cf.
additional profiling on CoreMark in Appendix G).
To handle delegation of such complex data structures, the Hard-
Scope GCC Plug-in must infer the relationship between linked data
structures and emit instructions to allow HardScope hardware to
derive the complete set of SRS entries that must be delegated for
that structure. Our current GCC Plug-in implementation can de-
rive SRS entries for structures allocated from memory pools known
statically (a common pattern in embedded applications). However,
to provide finer granularity policies that better match developer
intent, a developer writing software for a HardScope-enabled plat-
form can insert srdlg and srdsub instructions manually where
needed. The HardScope support files include compiler macros for
this purpose. Standard data structures can be provided with wrapper
functions. Employing more sophisticated program analysis could
insert such wrappers automatically.
5.3 Hardware Implementation
We developed a proof-of-concept hardware implementation of Hard-
Scope and extended it to the open-source RISC-V Pulpino core.8
We modified the instruction decoding stage of the processor
pipeline to interpret the new instructions (Section 5.1). To mini-
mize modifications to the decode stage all new instructions were
encoded in RISC-V’s existing S-type instruction format that allows
up to two registers operands and a 12-bit signed integer immediate
operand for each instruction. After decoding, the appropriate control
signals are sent to the HardScope unit, which realizes the execute
stage of the new instructions. Figure 3 shows the main components
of the HardScope unit: the SRS controller (❶), dedicated memory
to hold the SRS (❷), and three register banks (❸, ❹, ❺). The active
bank (❸) holds the entries in the SRS frame for the current execution
context enabling each memory access to be compared against all
active entries efficiently. The spare bank (❹) holds entries delegated
8http://www.pulp-platform.org/
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via srdlg and srdsub before a HardScope context switch oc-
curs. It allows delegated entries for the next execution context to
be accumulated ahead of time. When a HardScope context switch
occurs, the spare bank becomes the active bank (and vice versa),
thus activating the delegated entries. The third bank (❺) is used as a
cache to hold a copy of the topmost frame of the SRS. This reduces
the latency when the topmost SRS frame is transferred between stack
memory and the spare bank.
When executing sbent, the controller activates the spare bank
and transfers the contents of the currently active bank to the cache
(❻) in a single cycle. The bank that held the previously active frame
becomes the spare, and can be used for subsequent delegations.
The entries in the cache must be stored for future use, and are
transferred to the SRS in protected memory (❼) over at most 𝑁
subsequent cycles, where 𝑁 is the maximum number of entries in
the cache. During this time, the CPU continues to execute subsequent
instructions normally until a new HardScope context switch occurs.
Only if a HardScope context switch occurs before the cache has
been emptied does the processor stall until the transfer is complete.
When executing sbxit, the controller copies the SRS frame
from the cache into the spare bank (❽) while retaining delegated
entries (i.e., activating the entries that are already in the spare bank).
The SRS frame in the previously active bank is no longer needed
and is discarded. This executes in a single cycle. The cache, which
now holds an out-of-date copy of the active frame, is updated with
the topmost SRS frame from the protected memory (❾), which takes
at most 𝑁 cycles, where 𝑁 is the number of entries in the topmost
SRS frame in memory. This transfer to the cache does not stall the
processor unless another sbxit is encountered before the cache is
fully populated, in which case the CPU stalls until the next frame is
available. However, if an sbent is encountered before the cache is
fully populated, the partial cache is discarded and replaced with the
contents of the active bank, without stalling.
The sradd and srdda instructions always operate on the active
bank. When executing srdsub, the controller checks the active
bank for an entry containing the given memory region and, if found,
adds the new sub-entry to the spare bank. Similarly, in srdlg, the
controller checks for the matching entry in the active bank and,
if found, copies the entry to the spare bank (❿). The srdlg and
srdsub instructions require an additional cycle only if followed
immediately by a context switching HardScope instruction that
modifies the spare bank.
Integrating HardScope into the processor pipeline at the execute
stage also required modifying the memory access stage to intercept
all memory access requests to the load/store unit. At each load or
store instruction, the requested memory address and the number
of requested bytes (one byte, half-word (two bytes), or word (four
bytes)) are evaluated to a memory address range to be fetched from
memory. The request is forwarded to the SRS controller, which
compares it against all entries in the active bank. The registers in
each bank are wired to comparators that enable all entries in the
bank to be checked in parallel. If a match is found, i.e. the requested
address range is a subset of any of the active entries, then the request
is allowed to be evaluated by the processor’s load/store unit, other-
wise a hardware fault is raised. The memory access intercepted by
HardScope executes without incurring additional cycles to load
and store instructions.
Since both HardScope instructions as well as load and store
instructions require access to the HardScope hardware unit, we
multiplexed shared access to it according to the currently decoded
instruction. To ensure correct and hazard-free execution of the Hard-
Scope instructions within the pipeline, processor stalls due to Hard-
Scope instructions are engineered in the processor pipeline. sbent
and sbxit instructions require that the processor stalls if another
sbent or sbxit is encountered within 𝑁 cycles. The value 𝑁 cor-
responds to maximum number of entries in the cache bank. Hence,
this is determined by the HardScope unit and indicated in stall
control signals sent back to the decode stage which enforces the
stall only when an sbent or sbxit instruction is encountered.
The srdlg and srdsub instructions effectively need to stall for a
an extra single cycle only if directly followed by context switching
HardScope instructions. Being a pre-defined stall that only gets
enforced if the next instruction is also a HardScope instruction,
this is controlled directly in the decode stage and requires no feed-
back from the HardScope unit. Stall control for HardScope must
also not conflict with other processor stalls associated with load,
store and any branch instructions in case these directly follow
or precede HardScope instructions. To also overcome potential data
hazards, operand and data forwarding from preceding instructions
is also supported for our HardScope instructions. This eliminates
the need to inject additional stalls when results from preceding in-
structions are not yet updated in the registers but are required by the
current HardScope instruction, which often occurs with sradd
and srdda instructions that are preceded by auxiliary instructions
that load immediate values to their operand registers.
We fully integrated HardScope with the Pulpino core and syn-
thesized the extended processor on a Xilinx Zynq-7020 ZedBoard
All Programmable SoC.9 The instruction-level functionality was val-
idated by performing a register-transfer level (RTL) cycle-accurate
simulation of the integrated hardware design using ModelSim/Ques-
taSim.10 We also extended Spike11, the official RISC-V ISA simula-
tor to support our HardScope instruction set extension.
5.4 Simulator Implementation
We extended Spike12, the official RISC-V ISA simulator to support
our HardScope instruction set extension. Spike is part of the official
RISC-V infrastructure and is currently the most accurate simulator
for RISC-V assembler programs. It is regularly maintained by the
RISC-V community, well integrated into the toolchain, and supports
debugging with the GNU debugger (GDB). We used it to analyze
the security properties and performance profile of RSE, and we
have also made it available for developers and researchers who
wish to reproduce our results or experiment with other uses of our
HardScope instruction set extension.13
9http://zedboard.org
10https://www.mentor.com/products/fv/questa/
11https://github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-sim
12https://github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-sim
13The enhanced version of the Spike simulator is included with our accompanying
materials at: https://goo.gl/TAjLxy
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The simulator was extended by adding a SRS module to the
Memory Management Unit (MMU) of the processor. Similar to
our hardware design (Section 5.3), this module includes two banks
of SRS registers for active and delegated entries, and a stack for
inactive frames. Each executed HardScope instruction is passed
to our SRS module, which faithfully simulates the behavior of a
real hardware implementation. It also collects performance profiling
statistics including the number of executed instructions, frequency
of context switches, sizes of SRS frames, and the number of access
checks performed.
6 EVALUATION
To demonstrate the functionality of HardScope, we first show how
it comprehensively mitigates Hu et al.’s [17] DOP attack (described
in Section 2), and in Appendix C we explain how it mitigates all
other known DOP attacks, including the attack by Evans [14]. We
then evaluate the security of HardScope with reference to the re-
quirements defined in Section 3, and analyze its performance and
area overhead.
6.1 DOP Mitigation Example
We replicated the DOP attack by Hu et al. [17] and ported the code
to Pulpino to evaluate the effectiveness of HardScope. Although
it was not possible to port the complete ProFTPD to our FPGA
testbed or simulation environment, we concentrated our evaluation
on the vulnerable sreplace() function.14 We automatically in-
strumented this code with HardScope instructions using our GCC
compiler extensions. This means that all enforcement rules in the test
programs are derived without any developer annotations – the GCC
intermediate representation contains all information necessary for
compile-time instrumentation, including: stack-frame sizes, global
variable accesses, function calls, parameters, and return values. We
used our modified Spike simulator to trace the execution for both be-
nign and malicious inputs, and verified that our instrumentation did
not affect the correctness of the program under benign inputs. The
source code and instrumented symbolic assembler files are included
in the supplementary material.15
We identified five ways in which RSE prevents this DOP attack.
Any one of these would be sufficient to stop the attack, and thus
the existence of five distinct mitigation points demonstrates the
effectiveness of RSE’s layered defense strategy. All five were also
verified experimentally using our modified Spike simulator.
1) The initial memory violation in sreplace() is caused by
an out-of-bounds sstrncpy() to a local stack buffer buf. The
bound for the sstrncpy() call is calculated as sizeof(buf)
- strlen(pbuf). The contents of pbuf is attacker-controlled,
and left without a trailing null terminator causes the subtraction
to yield a negative value. Interpreted as an unsigned integer this
causes sstrncpy() to overflow. RSE instrumentation records and
enforces the intended bounds of buf and pbuf, thus preventing the
out-of-bounds access by strlen() and sstrncpy().
2) The DOP program keeps internal state in unused areas of the
program’s data section. By default, RSE denies access to such unused
14For the same reason, it is also not possible to run standard SPEC benchmarks on this
small microcontroller.
15https://goo.gl/TAjLxy
areas from all functions. The attacker could attempt to work around
this by using pre-existing global variables. However, because access
to globals can be narrowed by the use of RSE, all the DOP gadgets
must either share access to the same global data structure, or all
be reachable by data flows to and from this data structure. Gadgets
that legitimately share access to such data are more likely to use
this data in benign program operation. This is undesirable for DOP
because re-purposing such data could have unwanted side-effects on
program execution, or be overwritten during benign operations, thus
significantly limiting the amount of data or the set of gadgets that
can be used in the attack.
3) The exploit corrupts variables in global data structures to con-
trol the operands of the addition and dereference gadgets. During
benign execution, the sreplace() function should only operate
on a copy of the main_server.ServerName pointer passed by
value, and on unrelated fields in the global session structure, also
passed by value. Therefore, RSE denies sreplace() access to
these global variables, and thus blocks the addition and dereference
gadgets by preventing the attacker from controlling their respective
operands.
4) The dereference gadget accesses ssl_ctx via a pointer in-
cluded in the DOP payload and traverses the chain of linked struc-
tures to determine the location of the secret key. Since ssl_ctx is
defined as a global static in the mod_tls.c source file, RSE pre-
vents the dereference gadget from accessing this structure or linked
structures.
5) Once the address is known, sreplace() is used to corrupt a
local static mons array containing string pointers. The mons array
(Appendix B) contains pointers to string literals in the program’s
data section that are used by the pr_strtime() function to for-
mat human readable dates. Each pointer in mons is redirected to the
same memory location. One byte of the secret key is then copied
to that location. Whenever any date is formatted by the corrupt
pr_strtime(), it leaks a few bytes of the key to the attacker.
The process is repeated until the entire key has been extracted. RSE
prevents this exfiltration in two ways: Firstly, because the scope
of mons is local to the pr_strtime() function, sreplace()
cannot overwrite it with new pointers. Secondly, RSE ensures that
pr_strtime() cannot access the key, even if it attempts to deref-
erence corrupt mons pointers.
Although RSE cannot guarantee the absence of usable data-
oriented gadgets in arbitrary programs, this example demonstrates
how RSE significantly limits the expressiveness of DOP attacks in
programs with at least some degree of structural data separation, e.g.,
by minimizing the scope of variables (see Section 3), as is the case
in virtually all real-world programs.
6.2 Security Considerations
R1. Multi-granularity enforcement. With the appropriate instru-
mentation, HardScope instructions can be used to enforce memory
protection at run-time for any granularity of protection domain and
any granularity of protected region. Our enhanced GCC compiler
automatically emits HardScope instructions at function-level gran-
ularity which, as shown in Section 2) and Appendix C is necessary
and sufficient to thwart currently known DOP attacks. However,
HardScope can also be used to enforce policies with either coarser
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1 static char name[40];
2 static char password[16];
3
4 void fun(char *buf, int len) {
5 int x = len - 1;
6
7 for (int i = 0; i<len; i++, x--) {
8 name[i] = buf[x]; // overflows when len > 40
9 }
10
11 // do something with password
12 }
Listing 4: C program with a for loop containing a potentially
vulnerable memory error. There is no bounds checking when
writing to the name buffer.
or finer granularity of execution contexts. This is possible because
HardScope instructions are agnostic to programming language and
language constructs. We show an example of finer granularity in
Appendix E by isolating the function prologue and epilogue from
the function body. Thus even if the function body contains a memory
error, this cannot be used to corrupt the return address on the stack
(i.e., prevents control-flow hijacking). For both of the above granular-
ities, all necessary information about the protection domains can be
deduced by the compiler, thus allowing automatic instrumentation.
Instrumentation at other granularities could also be inferred from
existing language constructs (e.g., loops) or may require developer
annotations.
As another example, consider the simple loop in Listing 4. The
for loop forms a separate code block in terms of lexical scope.
Since the index variable i is declared in the loop signature, it cannot
be accessed from outside the for loop. The statement in the loop
body accesses the name array, the buf array, and the len integer.
The loop can be isolated in a separate execution context from the
rest of the function body by surrounding it with sbent and sbxit
instructions. Access to name and the buffer referenced by buf are
delegated to the loop’s execution context via srdlg, and access
to the variable i, which is not accessed from outside the loop, is
delegated with srdlgm. This ensures that the for loop is executed
with minimal privileges. Should the value of len exceed the size of
the name buffer, RSE prevents the buffer operation from overflowing
into the password array, which should only be accessed later in
the function body.
In addition to execution contexts deduced from C control con-
structs, such as loops, the programmer may use unnamed blocks
to group related code and data together. Any variables declared in-
side an unnamed block are considered by the compiler to exist only
within the block’s lexical scope. HardScope can make use of this
standard language feature to automatically infer developer intent
when determining execution contexts during instrumentation.
R2. Context-specific enforcement. In HardScope, the set of
active SRS entries can differ between different invocations of the
same subject, depending on which entries have been delegated to
this subject (e.g., variables passed to a function by its caller or callee
functions).
R3. Complete mediation. Since HardScope hardware checks
every memory access against the currently active set of SRS entries,
a memory access without a matching entry will fail. Therefore, the
only possible memory accesses are those that would be allowed by
a compile-time check. We discuss the scalability, performance and
area overhead in Section 6.3.
Preventing confused deputies. In a confused deputy attack, the
attacker attempts to subvert the RSE property by misusing existing
HardScope instructions at run-time to create unintended rules (i.e.,
rule-creating instructions are the confused deputies). Our design
ensures that no such instructions are available to the attacker. In-
structions that create rules for static allocations (stack and global
variables) are encoded directly into the instrumentation. Since these
cannot be modified at run-time, they cannot be used as confused
deputies. Instructions that create rules for dynamic allocations could
potentially be used as confused deputies, but this is practically in-
feasible because these instructions are only found within memory
allocators e.g., malloc(). It is reasonable to assume that memory
allocators are trusted (or at least that the absence of run-time vul-
nerabilities can be easily verified). We recommend that manually
annotated code is vetted for allocators that create arbitrary rules
at run-time. Furthermore, an attacker can only initiate a confused
deputy attack if he already controls some part of the code, which
is very difficult since every memory access in the instrumented
program is checked by the HardScope hardware.
Interfacing with legacy code. Legacy code, such as pre-
compiled shared libraries, can be instrumented using wrapper func-
tions. For example, our malloc() wrapper (Section 5.2) provides
function-granularity isolation for delegated objects and the stack
frame, and provides coarse-grained module-level isolation for other
library data.
Mitigating DOP attacks. As shown above, HardScope fulfils
all requirements defined in Section 3, and as shown in Section 6.1
and Appendix C, function-level granularity is sufficient to mitigate
all currently known DOP attacks (at multiple points in each attack).
Mitigating ROP attacks. Additionally, HardScope can defend
against ROP attacks. As explained in Appendix E, the function
prologue and epilogue are placed in a separate execution context
from the function’s main body. By restricting a function’s return state
information only to the prologue/epilogue’s execution context, Hard-
Scope protects this information from the potentially corrupted main
body of the function. Without the ability to control the function’s
return value, an attacker cannot mount ROP attacks.
6.3 Performance and Area Overhead
We evaluated the performance and area overhead of HardScope
using the extended Pulpino processor synthesized using Xilinx Vi-
vado16 for the ZedBoard 7020 prototyping kit.17 For the perfor-
mance evaluations, we used both the ProFTPD code excerpt (Sec-
tion 6.1) as well as the CoreMark processor benchmark.18
Performance evaluation (ProFTPD excerpt). This program
consists of 527 lines of C code and its deepest call chain is seven
levels deep. Table 2 shows the total cycle count for each type of
HardScope instruction, and the number of cycles for which the
processor was stalled when running on a HardScope equipped core,
16https://www.xilinx.com/products/design-tools/vivado.html
17http://zedboard.org
18http://www.eembc.org/coremark/index.php
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Table 2: Breakdown of HardScope performance overhead by
instruction for ProFTPD excerpt.
# instr # cycles # stalls overheada
sbent 759 994 235 0.4%
sbxit 759 807 48 0.3%
sradd 348 348 - 0.1%
sradd 759 759 - 0.3%
srdlg 819 819 - 0.3%
srdsub 23 23 - 0.0%
Other 641 641 - 0.2%
HardScope total 4108 4391 283 1.6%
aCalculations based on uninstrumented ProFTPD excerpt (276463 cycles).
compared with the unmodified program. In the instrumented version,
the cycle counts for already existing instructions, including load/s-
tore, are not affected. Since rules are checked in parallel, the number
of enforcement rules per subject does not impact performance up to
the number of available HardScope registers. Taking into account
the added HardScope instructions, the processor stalls, and the
additional instructions needed to support the instrumentation, the
total performance overhead was 1.6%.
Performance evaluation (CoreMark). CoreMark is a synthetic
CPU performance benchmark for embedded systems based on a
realistic mixture of commonly used algorithms including matrix
and linked list manipulation, state machine operations, and Cyclic
Redundancy Checks (CRCs).19 It consists of ~1500 lines of C code,
with a deepest call chain of 11 levels. All instrumentation in Core-
Mark was automatically generated by our extended GCC compiler,
and we ran the benchmark on the Pulpino SoC extended with Hard-
Scope instructions. Binary size increased by 11% as a result of
instrumentation. Table 3 shows the total number of executed Hard-
Scope instructions, the number of consumed cycles, and the number
of cycles the processor was stalled for a single iteration of Core-
Mark, compared with an unmodified version. The added instructions
account for a performance overhead of 3.1%. We also ran CoreMark
with varying iteration counts on the FPGA and observed an average
overall performance overhead of 3.2%. The number of entries per
SRS frame varied between 1 and 23, with a maximum of 11 frames.
Area and memory overhead. We synthesizedHardScope using
Xilinx Vivado for a Xilinx Zynq-7020 ZedBoard (Virtex-7 XC7Z020
FPGA). Figure 4 shows the number of look-up tables (LUTs) and
registers required to support different numbers of entries per SRS
frame. As expected, the area overhead increases linearly with the
bank size (i.e., the maximum number of entries per frame), since
more entries must be checked in parallel.
To support a bank size of 16 and a maximum of 16 frames (i.e., a
protected memory size of 16×16 entries), HardScope uses 10, 376
LUTs, 3, 221 registers, and one 18 kB block RAM. This is less
area than a 128-bit high-throughput pipelined hardware AES cipher,
which uses 12, 475 LUTs and 10, 769 registers.20 The Pulpino SoC
itself uses 15, 444 LUTs and 9, 758 registers. We also synthesized
19http://www.eembc.org/coremark/faq.php
20https://opencores.org/project,aes-128_pipelined_encryption
Table 3: Breakdown of HardScope performance overhead by
instruction for one iteration of CoreMark.
# instr # cycles # stalls overheada
sbent 2512 3184 672 0.7%
sbxit 2512 3083 571 0.7%
sradd 318 318 - 0.1%
sradd 2511 2511 - 0.5%
srdlg 1379 1459 80 0.3%
srdsub 654 990 336 0.2%
Other 2742 2964 - 0.6%
HardScope total 9886 11544 1243 3.1%
aCalculations based on uninstrumented CoreMark (458150 cycles).
CoreMark configuration details are in Appendix G.
512
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Maximum number of entries per SRS frame (bank size)
LUTs Registers
Figure 4: Logic resources (LUTs and registers) required to sup-
port different numbers of entries per SRS frame and protected
memory for 16 frames.
this HardScope configuration using Synopsys Design Compiler tar-
geting the NanGate 45 nm Open Cell Library21 which gave a logic
size of approximately 800,000 transistors. In comparison to a mod-
ern general-purpose SoC, such as the Apple A10 quad-core ARM64
mobile SoC (3.3 billion transistors), the area overhead of Hard-
Scope is negligible. Thus, HardScope is suitable for deployment
on a wide range of SoCs, including small MCUs like the Pulpino.
7 RELATED WORK
Various software-only and hardware-assisted memory safety tech-
nologies have been proposed and/or deployed (e.g., [1, 3, 5–
8, 11, 13, 20–22, 30, 31]). We discuss those that aim to mitigate
non-control-data attacks. Figure 5 shows a taxonomy of defenses
that can instantiate policies effective against DOP. To the best of our
knowledge, RSE is the first scheme that specifically considers DOP
attacks in its threat model.
Pointer Safety can prevent spatial memory errors that are ex-
ploited in memory corruption attacks. Typical realizations associate
a base address and upper bound with each pointer, and check that
the memory accesses that occur when dereferencing the pointer fall
within those bounds. We call these schemes pointer-oriented. The
21http://www.nangate.com/
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head. The figure shows only defenses that can support a vari-
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associated bounds metadata can either be stored with each pointer
or in a disjoint area of memory.
Fat-pointer schemes add bounds metadata directly to the pointer
e.g., by increasing the length of the pointer [27] or borrowing unused
bits from the pointer [20]. This incurs only a small memory overhead
but changes the memory layout of program in ways that break both
binary and source code compatibility.
BIMA [22] is a hardware-assisted fat-pointer scheme developed
within the SAFE project.22 BIMA encodes pointer bounds metadata
within the pointer itself (e.g., on a 64 bit system, it assumes that
46 bit addresses are sufficient). On the simplified SAFE processor,
a clean-slate ISA design which includes various security enhance-
ments, this scheme has no performance overhead and worst-case
16% memory overhead. However, the compact encoding of pointer
metadata results in alignment restrictions on pointers. This necessi-
tates the use of custom stack allocators when applying this approach
to stack data structures [12].
SoftBound [25] and HardBound [11] use pointer bounds metadata
stored in disjoint shadow space memory to ensure pointer safety. Al-
though this retains the program’s original memory layout, it requires
bounds information to be fetched from the shadow space before
checks. SoftBound breaks cache locality and leads to additional
cache misses when retrieving pointer bounds, incurring an average
performance overhead of 67% in standard benchmarks. HardBound
is a hardware-assisted scheme where the processor checks asso-
ciated pointer bounds implicitly when a pointer is dereferenced.
HardBound incurs an average performance overhead of≈10%. Both
schemes exhibit a worst-case memory overhead of ≈200%.
Intel’s Memory Protection Extensions23 (MPX), introduced in
the Intel Skylake microarchitecture in late 2015, is currently the
only example of hardware-assisted pointer safety technology being
deployed in real systems. MPX adds new instructions for performing
bounds checks on pointers. MPX stores bounds metadata in a disjoint
memory area. Bounds information for up to four pointers can be
stored in dedicated registers for fast checks. Oleksenko et al. [28]
found that MPX incurs an average performance overhead of 50%
22http://www.crash-safe.org/
23https://software.intel.com/en-us/isa-extensions/intel-mpx
and a memory overhead of 1.9x, largely due to the time and memory
required for storing and loading bounds metadata.
Unlike the above pointer-oriented schemes, RSE (e.g., Hard-
Scope) is block-oriented as it associates access control rules with
blocks of code, rather than individual pointers. However, as Hard-
Scope policies can be applied at the granularity of even single
instructions, it can also enforce pointer safety. HardScope retains
the program’s original memory layout and does not require special
alignment of pointers. In addition, HardScope also validates that
pointer dereferences occur from legitimate execution contexts.
Red-Zone Tripwires can be used to ensure partial pointer safety
against contiguous overflows. By placing a block of invalid memory
that acts as a "red-zone" between memory objects. Loads and stores
are instrumented to verify if the red-zone is tripped. Contiguous
overflows, e.g. past an array boundary will hit the red-zone tripwire.
This provides only partial pointer safety, as non-contiguous accesses
or accesses with a larger step distance than the size of the red-zone
can violate spatial safety without setting of the tripwire Modern
compilers, such as GCC and LLVM, support instrumenting code
operating with red-zone tripwire based run-time bounds checks via
AddressSanitizer [31].
Pointer authenticity can ensure the unforgeability of pointers,
preventing non-control-data attacks and use of DOP gadgets that
rely on retargeting pointers.
Yarra [30] is a variant C that ensures the authenticity of a pointer’s
type for critical data types ascribed by the programmer. YARRA
guarantees that such critical data is only written through pointers
with the given static type. However, YARRA incurs a prohibitively
high overhead when used for whole program protection (4x - 6x).
PointGuard [9] instruments programs to encrypt all pointers at
run-time by XORing them against a key generated at program initial-
ization. Pointers are decrypted before dereference. PointGuard incurs
a small to medium overhead (0% - 20%) in real-world programs,
but is vulnerable to information disclosure e.g., if the ciphertext of a
known pointer becomes known to an attacker.
ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication [29] is a hardware-assisted mech-
anism in the ARMv8.3 processor architecture that ensures the au-
thenticity of pointers by calculating a Pointer Authentication Code
(PAC) as a keyed MAC of the pointer value and a 64-bit context
(e.g., the current value of the stack pointer). The PAC is stored in the
unused bits of 64-bit pointers and verified before dereferencing the
pointer to ensure its authenticity. The inclusion of the context value
prevents unauthorized copying of the pointer and its PAC to another
context within the program. The ARMv8.3 architecture provides
four keys for PAC (two for code pointer / two for data pointers) and
a fifth key usable for general purpose authentication code generation.
The keys are stored in internal CPU register and are not accessible
from user mode, but must be managed by privileged software (e.g.,
ephemeral keys per process for user mode, or per boot for kernel
mode).
HardScope does not provide pointer authenticity, but when ap-
plied at a fine granularity, it can greatly reduce the attack surface of
pointers and non-pointer data.
Software compartmentalization aims to mitigate the conse-
quences of memory vulnerabilities by isolating software components
into distinct protection domains.
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Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [13, 24, 35] compartmentalizes
software at a module level e.g., kernel modules and dynamically
loaded libraries. Non-control-data and DOP attacks cannot interact
with data outside the module boundary but attacks that operate
fully within the confines of a single module remain viable. Byte
Granularity Isolation (BGI) [8] is an SFI variant that instruments
kernel extensions and can enforce access control policies at fine data
granularity with moderate overhead (0%-16%).
Data-Flow Integrity (DFI) [7] is a software-only approach for
mitigating control-flow and non-control-data attacks. At compile-
time, static analysis constructs a data-flow graph of a program. The
code is instrumented to record the last instruction that wrote to each
variable. On every read, the origin of the last write is checked against
the pre-computed data-flow graph. Like HardScope, DFI can be
instantiated at various granularities. Intraproc DFI only instruments
uses of control-data and uses of local variables without definitions
outside their function, thus providing function-granularity isolation
for stack data. Interproc DFI isolates individual data flows from
each other. Intraproc DFI incurs 46% and Interproc DFI incurs
104% performance overhead and 50% memory overhead. Hardware-
Assisted Data-flow Isolation (HDFI) [34] provides instruction-level
granularity isolation by tagging each machine word in memory and
every memory access instruction with a protection domain. However,
it only supports two simultaneous protection domains.
Probabilistic schemes aim to randomize the data or its layout at
run-time so that unauthorized accesses would have unpredictable
results. Data Randomization [6] uses static analysis to partition
code into equivalence classes, and then instruments all load/store
operations to XOR the data with a class-specific mask. Data Space
Randomization [5] randomizes the layout of data in memory. How-
ever, probabilistic schemes rely on some secret information (e.g.,
the XOR mask or randomization secret) which if leaked or inferred
by the attacker could undermine the scheme.
Hardware-architectures that enable different protection models
have been proposed. Fine-grained tagged memory systems e.g.,
lowRISC24 can be used to assist the implementation of sophisti-
cated memory access policies, including RSE. However, unlike
HardScope, lowRISC only differentiates between access types
(read/write) and can not apply different policies per subject without
reprogramming. Intel Memory Protection Keys (MPK)25 provides
hardware support to associate memory at page granularity to one of
16 distinct protection domains, but unlike HardScope, it does not
support context-specific policies or delegation.
CHERI [37] is hardware-assisted capability model that extends
the 64-bit MIPS ISA with byte-granularity enforcement of memory
accesses. CHERI can support various protection models, such as
pointer safety [37] and software compartmentalization [36] at library
or module level. However, programs must be re-engineered by hand
to benefit from CHERI.
Run-time attestation, such as Control-Flow Attestation [2, 10] can
detect, but not prevent, both control-flow and some non-control-data
attacks.
Although HardScope shares many of the same goals as the
above schemes, it differs in several fundamental aspects. Compared
24http://www.lowrisc.org/downloads/lowRISC-memo-2014-001.pdf
25https://www.kernel.org/doc//x86/protection-keys.txt
to software-based schemes (e.g., DFI [7] and SoftBound [25]), Hard-
Scope has significantly lower overhead, does not require whole-
program static analysis, and can enforce different rules during dif-
ferent invocations of the same function (context-specific memory
isolation). HardScope RSE policies can be instantiated for a large
class of programs without additional input from developers (cf.,
YARRA [30]), or software re-engineering (cf., CHERI). It also re-
duces the amount of metadata that must be stored at execution time
by requiring only storage for rules pertaining to the active set of
execution contexts. Thanks to limiting the rules that are needed for
enforcement at any given time, HardScope also makes it feasible to
cache that metadata in on-chip memory, and enable implicit access
checks with no overhead.
8 CONCLUSION
By implementing and evaluating HardScope, we demonstrated that
RSE is a novel, effective approach to protect against memory vulner-
abilities at run time. HardScope can also enforce memory isolation
at coarser or finer granularity, to facilitate different types of memory
protection strategies. In future work we plan to integrate HardScope
with a general purpose RISC-V core (e.g. the Rocket Core [4] and
extend our RSE GCC Plug-in to support more protection models. To
support reproducibility of our results, we provide 1) our enhanced
GCC compiler, which can automatically instrument unmodified C
programs; 2) instrumented binaries of our test programs; and 3) a
version of the official RISC-V simulator with added support for
HardScope instructions.
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A EXCERPT FROM SREPLACE
Listing 5 shows an excerpt from the vulnerable sreplace() function in ProFTPD.
1 char *sreplace(pool *p, char *s, ...) {
2 char *src = s; // ❶ pointer to next unprocessed character in input buffer parameter
3 char *cp; // pointer to next free entry in buf
4 char **mptr; // pointer to replacement pattern
5 char **rptr; // pointer to replacement string
6 char *marr[33]; // replacement pattern string array
7 char *rarr[33]; // replacement string array
8 *pbuf = NULL; // pointer to beginning of buf
9
10 // destination buffer
11 char buf[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX] = {'\0'};
12
13 // unsigned sizes of pattern, string and buf
14 size_t mlen = 0, rlen = 0, blen;
15
16 cp = pbuf = buf;
17 blen = sizeof(buf);
18
19 while (*src) { // until input exhausted...
20 // ...match substring against all patterns
21 for (mptr = marr, rptr = rarr;
22 *mptr; // null indicates end of array
23 mptr++, rptr++) {
24 mlen = strlen(*mptr); // length of pattern
25 rlen = strlen(*rptr); // length of string
26 if (strncmp(src, *mptr, mlen) == 0) {
27 sstrncpy( // copy replacement to buffer
28 cp, *rptr, // dest, src
29 // ❹ integer underflow when blen less than length of pbuf string
30 blen - strlen(pbuf) // n bytes to copy
31 );
32 }
33 }
34
35 if (!*mptr) { // no pattern matched
36 if ((cp - pbuf + 1) > blen) { // ❸ off-by-one bounds-check
37 cp = pbuf + blen - 1;
38 }
39 *cp++ = *src++; // ❷ copy character verbatim
40 }
41 }
42 }
Listing 5: Excerpt from sreplace() function in proftpd/src/support.c [17]. The src pointer is set to the next character
of the input string containing replacement patterns (❶). When input does not match a replacement pattern, the character is copied
verbatim to the output buffer (❷). The preceding bounds check is off-by-one (❸), allowing the null-terminator to be overwritten.
During the immediately following iteration of the while loop, strlen(bpuf) will exceed the size of blen, resulting in an integer
underflow of the n parameter to sstrncpy() (❹), allowing the attacker to overwrite the local variables on the stack and gain control
of sreplace().
B EXCERPT FROM PR_STRTIME
Listing 6 shows an excerpt from the pr_strtime() function in ProFTPD [17].
1 const char *pr_strtime(time_t t) {
2 static char buf[30]; // output buffer
3 static char *mons[] = { "Jan", "Feb", // . . .
Listing 6: Excerpt of ProFTPd’s pr_strtime() function with mons array. pr_strtime() indexes mons by month number, copies
the corresponding string literal to the static output buffer, and returns a pointer to the output buffer.
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C OTHER KNOWN DOP ATTACKS
C.1 DOP attacks against ProFTPD
In addition to the DOP program that bypasses randomization de-
fenses discussed in Section 6.2, Hu et al. [17] present two additional
end-to-end attacks against ProFTPD. Both attacks build on the idea
of leveraging DOP to corrupt relocation information maintained by
the Linux runtime linker. The runtime linker maintains a link_map
structure for each loaded ELF object. The link_map structure con-
tains the name of the corresponding ELF object, the base address
at which the object is loaded, and the virtual address of all the ELF
object’s dynamic metadata tables.
In the DOP attack, the memory corruption vulnerability in
sreplace() is used to inject specially crafted symbol and re-
location metadata into the program’s data section. The linked list
of link_map structures is then corrupted to include the malicious
relocation metadata. The malicious relocation metadata is consumed
by the POSIX dlopen() function. dlopen() is responsible for
patching the relocated addresses before execution of the loaded
module. In order to do so, dlopen() has the ability to modify arbi-
trary memory locations, even code pages or read-only data sections.
ProFTPD invokes dlopen() in its PAM module to dynamically
load libraries. By corrupting a field in a global static data structure
used by PAM subsystem to keep track of loaded modules, the at-
tacker can trigger the invocation of dlopen(). As dlopen() is
invoked, it will process the malicious relocation metadata and trigger
an arbitrary memory corruption. This gives the attacker a powerful
DOP gadget capable of bypassing defenses based on non-writable
code or read-only data.
RSE prevents the attacker from escalating the sreplace()
assignment gadget into a powerful dlopen()-based assignment
in two ways. First, RSE can prevent sreplace() from tampering
with the link_map structure. Second, it can prevent sreplace()
from modifying the data structures belonging to the PAM subsystem.
C.2 DOP attacks against Wireshark
Hu et al. [17] also describe a DOP attack against the Wireshark 26
network protocol analyzer. The attack targets a stack buffer overflow
vulnerability CVE-2014-2299 27 in the
packet_list_dissect_and_cache_record(), as
shown in Listing 7. A pointer to the local stack buffer pd in
packet_list_dissect_and_cache_record() is passed
to cf_read_frame_r() which overflows it (❶). This allows the
attacker to control the contents of stack variables col and *cinfo
(❷). In order to chain gadgets found in
packet_list_change_record() (❸, ❹) together, the
attacker must corrupt the loop condition cell_list (❺) in the
parent function
gtk_tree_view_column_cell_set_cell_data() to
ensure that the loop executes infinitely. To achieve this, the
cell_list is directed to a malicious linked-list in the malicious
payload.
RSE prevents the initial buffer overflow by ensuring that the
packet_list_dissect_and_cache_record() function
26https://www.wireshark.org/
27https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-2299
is only delegates access the pd array. Thus
cf_read_frame_r() is prevented from accessing variables in
its caller’s stack frame. Similarly, ensuring the availability of the
gadget dispatcher requires an out-of-scope access from
packet_list_change_record() to the cell_list
variable local to
gtk_tree_view_column_cell_set_cell_data().
RSE can thus prevent the DOP program establishing a reliable
gadget dispatcher for the attack.
1
2 void packet_list_dissect_and_cache_record(
3 PacketList *packet_list, /* ... */) {
4 gint col;
5 column_info *cinfo; // ❷
6 guint8 pd[WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE];
7
8 // ❶ initial buffer overflow
9 cf_read_frame_r(/* ... */, fdata,
10 /* ... */, pd);
11
12 packet_list_change_record(packet_list,
13 /* ... */,
14 col, cinfo);
15 }
16
17 void packet_list_change_record(
18 PacketList * packet_list,
19 PacketListRecord *record,
20 gint col,
21 column_info *cinfo) {
22 record = packet_list->physical_rows[row];
23
24 // ❸ assignment/load/store gadget
25 record->col_text[col] =
26 (gchar *) cinfo->col_data[col];
27
28 // ❹ conditional assignment gadget
29 if (!record->col_text_len[col])
30 ++packet_list->const_strings;
31 }
32
33 void gtk_tree_view_column_cell_set_cell_data(
34 GtkTreeViewColumn *self,
35 GtkTreeModel* tree_model,
36 GtkTreeIter* iter,
37 gboolean is_expander,
38 gboolean is_expanded);
39
40 /* ... */
41
42 // ❺ loop condition corrupted to enable gadget
dispatch
43 for (cell_list = tree_column->cell_list;
44 cell_list;
45 cell_list = cell_list->next) {
46 /* ... */
47
48 // eventually calls vulnerable function
49 show_cell_data_func();
50
51 /* ... */
52 }
Listing 7: Excerpt from
wireshark/ui/gtk/packet_list.c [17].
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C.3 DOP attacks against GStreamer
Evans [14] demonstrates an attack against the GStreamer FLIC de-
coder28 that exploits a combination of control-flow hijacking and
DOP techniques. The attack exploits a decode loop that lacks bounds
checks against the output frame_data buffer, as shown in List-
ing 8. The exploit can be triggered via a specially crafted media file
that causes the decode loop to write past the bounds of the heap-
resident buffer. The goal of the attacker is to escalate the buffer
overflow into an arbitrary code execution, but they cannot perform
a traditional control-flow attack due to the presence of ASLR. The
initial memory corruption vulnerability is non-linear, allowing the
attacker to skip over heap memory before the write, but only al-
lows the attacker to tamper with memory below the overflowing
frame_data buffer. Additionally the attacker targets program
logic that extracts metadata from a media file which only runs the
decode loop for two media frames, considerably limiting the initial
number of write gadgets possible to chain together.
GStreamer decoders are typically run in their own dedicated
threads with their own thread heap. When decoding begins in
a newly created decoder thread, the predictability of the initial
heap layout allows the attacker to corrupt the flxdec meta-
data object (Listing 9) typically allocated in the heap at a pre-
dictable offset below the frame_data buffer used by the de-
coder. By massaging the flxdec object into a state that keeps
the decode loop running beyond the initial two frame window,
the attacker obtains a DOP dadget dispatcher used to execute
the subsequent DOP payload. The DOP program leverages data-
oriented gadgets found in flx_decode_delta_fli() (List-
ing 8) and gst_flxdec_chain() (Listing 10) The assignment
gadget leverages the memcpy() from flxdec->delta_data
to flxdec->frame_data (❶). By corrupting these pointers
in the decode loop, the gadget can be used for arbitrary mem-
ory loads and stores. Combining this with the assignment gad-
get flxdec->frame_data to flxdec->delta_data in
gst_flxdex_chain() (❷) provides a dereference gadget. To-
gether with the assignment gadget (❸), these gadgets allow the DOP
program to perform a load / add / store during frame processing.
With this computational capability the attacker can obtain a code
pointer to a known function within the program’s code section, add
an offset to it to obtain a pointer into the program’s global offset
table (GOT) which contains relocated pointers to shared library func-
tions. Reading a GOT entry for a shared library function reveals the
randomized code pointer. This in turn enables the attacker to mount
a traditional control-flow attack on the derandomized code.
GStreamer attack operates by corrupting a heap object which
is legitimately within the scope of the decode loop with the initial
memory corruption vulnerability. Thus, preventing the GStreamer
attack is more challenging compared to the ProFTPD attacks de-
scribed in Section 6.1 and Appendix C.1. However, RSE can be
utilized by the caller to selectively delegate individual fields of the
dynamically allocated flxdec in flx_decode_delta_fli()
gst_flxdex_chain. Furthermore, by applying RSE at a block-
granularity, the vulnerable decode loop can be constrained to
stay within the bounds of the flxdec->delta_data and
flxdec->frame_data buffers.
28https://gstreamer.freedesktop.org
1 // called with dest argument flxdec->frame_data
2 flx_decode_delta_fli(GstFlxDec * flxdec,
3 guchar * data,
4 guchar * dest) {
5 // ❶ data-oriented assignment gadget
6 memcpy(dest, flxdec->delta_data, flxdec->size);
7
8 start_line = (data[0] + (data[1] << 8));
9 lines = (data[2] + (data[3] << 8));
10 data += 4;
11
12 /* start position of delta */
13 dest += (flxdec->hdr.width * start_line);
14 start_p = dest;
15
16 while (lines--) {
17 /* packet count */
18 packets = *data++;
19
20 while (packets--) {
21 /* skip count */
22 dest += *data++;
23
24 /* RLE count */
25 count = *data++;
26
27 if (count > 0x7f) {
28 /* ... */
29 } else {
30 /* replicate run */
31 while (count--)
32 *dest++ = *data++;
33 /* ... */
Listing 8: Excerpt from vulnerable decode loop
in gst-plugins-good/gst/flx/gstflxdec.c [14].
The attacker controls the contents of the data buffer
and can selectively write from data to memory beyond
the bounds of flxdec->frame_data by controlling the
start_line, lines, and packets variables. The data-
oriented assignment gadget❶ is reachable by corrupting the
flxdec heap object.
1 struct _GstFlxDec {
2 GstElement element;
3 GstPad *sinkpad;
4 GstPad *srcpad; // pointer to
5 // gst_flxdec_chain()
6 gboolean active, new_meta;
7 guint8 *delta_data, *frame_data;
8 GstAdapter *adapter;
9 gulong size;
10 GstFlxDecState state;
11 gint64 frame_time;
12 gint64 next_time;
13 gint64 duration;
14 FlxColorSpaceConverter *converter;
15 FlxHeader hdr;
16 };
Listing 9: Excerpt of flxdec struct from
gst-plugins-good/gst/flx/gstflxdec.h [14].
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1 gst_flxdec_chain(/* ... */) {
2
3 flx_decode_chunks(
4 flxdec,
5 ((FlxFrameType *) chunk)->chunks,
6 chunk + FlxFrameTypeSize,
7 flxdec->frame_data);
8
9 // ❷ data oriented assignment gadget
10 memcpy(flxdec->delta_data,
11 flxdec->frame_data,
12 flxdec->size);
13
14 gst_buffer_map(out, &map, GST_MAP_WRITE);
15 /* convert current frame. */
16 flx_colorspace_convert(
17 flxdec->converter,
18 flxdec->frame_data,
19 map.data);
20
21 gst_buffer_unmap (out, &map);
22
23 GST_BUFFER_TIMESTAMP (out) = flxdec->next_time;
24 // ❸ data oriented addition gadget
25 flxdec->next_time += flxdec->frame_time;
Listing 10: Excerpt from gst_flxdec_chain()
in gst-plugins-good/gst/flx/gstflxdec.c [14].
The data-oriented gadgets ❷ and ❸ are reachable by
corruping the flxdec heap object.
D STRICT DELEGATION
The lax delegation semantics for srsub and srdlg(m) (Sec-
tion 5.1) are not ideal in cases where a memory error in function
allows an attacker to corrupt a pointer subsequently delegated to a
callee function that operates with higher RSE privileges than the
caller (i.e., situations where the caller itself created the pointer, but
does not dereference it on its own). With lax delegation, the callee
may become the target of a confused deputy attack unless it validates
the pointer delegated to it prior to dereferencing. Addressing the
lack of such input validation is out-of-scope for HardScope, as
is protecting data which is legitimately in the scope of a vulnera-
ble function. However a small modification to delegation semantics
can prevent these confused deputy situations for a specific class of
programs in which the caller’s privileges are always a superset of
the callee’s privileges with respect to a delegated pointer. This is
achieved by implementing strict delegation, whereby the behaviour
of srsub and srdlg(m) is modified to generate a hardware fault
if a matching SRS entry for the specified sub-entry is not found.
This ensures that delegated pointers always target a subset of the
the caller’s RSE priviledges. In addition, srsub and srdlg(m)
must be modified to allow (ignore) the special case of delegating a
null-pointer. However, determining whether a program is suitable for
strict delegation may require dynamic data-flow program analysis.
E RETURN STATE PROTECTION
For ease of understanding, our examples so far have described a
slightly simplified version of RSE instrumentation in which a single
SRS entry is created for a function’s entire stack frame. In this
scenario, memory errors in the main body of the function could
1 ; ❶ function prologue
2 srdda -8(sp),sp ; create SRS entry for return state
3 addi sp,sp,-32 ; decrement stack pointer
4 sw ra,24(sp) ; store return address at sp+24
5 sw s0,20(sp) ; store frame pointer at sp+20
6 addi s0,sp,32 ; update frame pointer
7 ; ❷ argument delegation from prologue to body
8 srdlg a0 ; 1st argument pointer
9 srdlg a1 ; 2nd argument pointer
10 sbent ; enter body context
11 ; ❸ create SRS entry for local variables
12 sradd sp,23(sp)
13 ; ❹ function body
14 ; ...
15 srdlg a0 ; delegate returned object
16 sbxit ; exit into epilogue context
17 ; ❺ function epilogue
18 lw ra,24(sp) ; load return addr. from stack
19 lw s0,20(sp) ; load frame pointer from stack
20 addi sp,sp,32 ; increment stack pointer
21 srdlg a0 ; delegate returned object
22 sbxit ; exit function context
23 ret ; return to caller
Listing 11: Instrumented function with return state protection.
The function prologue and epilogue share the same execution
context.
allow an attacker to modify the function’s return address and other
return state information stored in the beginning of the stack frame.
However, under normal circumstances, this return state information
should only be accessed by the function prologue and epilogue, not
by code in the main body of the function. In our actual RSE design,
we enforce this separation by placing the function’s prologue and
epilogue into a different execution context from the function’s main
body. The return state information is thus covered by a different SRS
entry from the local stack variables.
Listing 11 demonstrates how our full RSE instrumentation pro-
tects the return address and saved frame pointer against modification
by potentially vulnerable code within the function body. Since the
prologue and epilogue surround the function’s main body, we in-
strument these to execute in two distinct execution contexts. The
prologue (❶) and epilogue (❺) share their execution context and
SRS frame, and can thus access the same area of the stack. They
can also access argument objects passed by reference and delegated
by the caller, and delegate these forward to the function body (❷).
Once the execution context of the function body has been entered
(line 10) an additional SRS entry is created for local stack variables
(❸), before the execution of the main function body begins (❹).
Exiting the function body’s execution context returns to the execu-
tion context set up by the prologue, whilst control flow proceeds to
the epilogue (❺). This protects the return state information during
the execution of the function body, and thus mitigates attacks that
require modification of this control-flow information (e.g., ROP).
F EXTENDING HARDSCOPE
As stated in section 3, in this work we restrict our attention to single-
threaded C programs. In this appendix, we outline the challenges
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in extending HardScope to support multi-threaded programs, Sym-
metric Multi-Processing (SMP), and C++, and we suggest possible
solutions to these challenges. The discussion here is not exhaustive,
and the implementation and evaluation of these extensions is beyond
the scope of this work.
Multi-threading. The current implementation of HardScope
maintains only a single SRS, and hence does support multiple con-
current execution contexts. However, when multiple processes or
threads are executed concurrently (e.g., interleaved by the CPU),
each must be associated with a distinct HardScope SRS. To fa-
cilitate this, HardScope must provide the means to store the full
SRS state of a thread when the thread is pre-empted, and restore the
thread’s SRS state when it is scheduled. The system must allocate
separate storage for each thread’s SRS and the HardScope hard-
ware must maintain a pointer to the current SRS e.g., in a dedicated
register. The system scheduler must update this SRS pointer register
when switching threads. Access controls should be put in place to
prevent unprivileged threads from tampering with any of the stored
SRS states, including their own, or with the SRS pointer register.
Privileged software must also have the ability to flush all records in
the active and spare banks into the SRS in memory during thread
scheduling, to ensure the coherency of the stored SRS.
Threads that co-operate on a computing task may need to share
data amongst each other e.g., by passing pointers to shared mem-
ory areas. To facilitate this, threads may need to delegate storage
region entries to one another. Currently, HardScope does not pro-
vide means of delegation across multiple SRSs. In order to enable
delegated access to shared memory areas, HardScope must be ex-
tended with a messagebox facility that allows the delegating thread
to identify a recipient thread and mark a storage region entry for
delegation to the recipient.
Symmetric Multi-Processing. In addition to the enhancements
to support multi-threading, SMP systems require additional con-
siderations to allow HardScope to maintain SRSs across multiple
processors or cores. Most importantly, the HardScope active, spare,
and cache banks must be duplicated for each distinct core. The SRS
should be maintained in memory that is accessible to each core,
and the messagebox facility must be extended to allow delegations
across cores.
C++. The most important factor in terms of extending Hard-
Scope to support the C++ runtime is enabling C++ exception han-
dling. Exceptions provide a way to transfer control from one execu-
tion context to another, possible separated by several links in the call
chain. The exception handling facility has the means to unwind the
call stack to the stack frame of the execution context that handles the
exception. In HardScope enabled programs, the exception handling
facility must also unwind the SRS to the corresponding SRS frame
belonging to the exception context. In the current implementation
of HardScope, the only way to achieve this is via the execution
of sbxit. While it would be possible for the exception handling
facility to issue multiple consecutive sbxit instructions until the
correct SRS frame has been restored, this is likely to cause unde-
sirable performance overhead due to the associated management
operations on the active, spare, and cache banks. Moreover, many
of these operations are unnecessary, as the result of the manage-
ment operations is immediately discarded on the next sbxit. To
improve the efficiency of exception handling, HardScope could
be extended with a facility that would enable fast unwinding of the
SRS stack to a previous state. A similar facility would also improve
the implementation of a HardScope aware C setjmp / longjmp
API.29
G COREMARK CONFIGURATION
The CoreMark benchmark program must be passed three seed val-
ues used for initialization of data during the benchmark. The seeds
must be input from a source that cannot be determined at compile
time to ensure that the compiler cannot pre-compute results to com-
pletely optimize away the work intended to be performed during
a benchmark. While in principle any seed values could be used,
three common sets of seeds have been designated by the CoreMark
developers to ensure that results from CoreMark runs remain com-
parable. The benchmark also contains self-test logic that ensures
the correctness of the work performed during the benchmark for the
common seeds.
As per industry recommendations30we use the profile run seeds
to obtain the results reported in Section 6.3. Table 5 shows the
performance overhead for different numbers of CoreMark iterations
measured on the FPGA. For completeness, we also ran the CoreMark
benchmark using the validation run and performance run seeds
to ensure that our instrumentation did not affect the correctness
of the benchmark. The results of the validation and performance
runs are reported in Table 4. For each run, we fixed the number of
CoreMark iterations to one. Because CoreMark was run in a cycle-
accurate simulated environment, the results of repeated runs yielded
the same cycle counts. For both the validation and performance
runs, the number of entries per SRS frame varied between 1 and
120, with a maximum of 11 frames required. The increased SRS
utilization was attributed to the increased number of allocations
performed by CoreMark’s linked list benchmark with the validation
and performance seed values.
Due to area limitations of our FPGA testbed, we were unable to
synthesize HardScope with a frame size of 120 entries. Instead,
we ran the validation and performance run benchmarks on both the
Spike-based simulator implementation and a cycle-accurate simula-
tion of the hardware implementation (Pulpino SoC extended with
HardScope) in Questa Advanced Simulator31. The cycle-accurate
overhead measured for the hardware implementation was at 4.9%
for the validation and performance runs, in contrast to 3.2% for the
profile run determined on the FPGA. The principal reason for the
increased overhead in Table 4 results compared to the profile run was
the increased number of stalls (2.8% overhead for both validation
and performance runs). The increase in stalls is a direct result from
the increased SRS utilization. Consequently, minimizing the num-
ber of stalls is an important consideration for maintaining efficient
HardScope performance in more complex programs. We discuss a
possible hardware-design optimization that would reduce the num-
ber of stall cycles in Appendix H. However, the number of stalls
can also be reduced by reducing the required SRS entries for each
29http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/setjmp.3.html
30http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.dai0350a/DAI0350A_coremark_
benchmarking.pdf
31https://www.mentor.com/products/fv/questa/
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Table 4: Breakdown of HardScope performance overhead by instruction for one iteration of CoreMark validation and performance
runs.
CoreMark CoreMark
(validation run) (performance run)
# instr # cycles # stalls overheada # instr # cycles # stalls overheadb
sbent 7095 31541 24446 2.00% 7157 32288 25132 2.04%
sbxit 7095 20288 13193 1.29% 7157 20635 13478 1.31%
sradd 1004 1004 - 0.01% 1024 1024 - 0.01%
srdda 7094 7094 - 0.45% 7156 7156 - 0.45%
srdlg 4327 8717 4390 0.55% 4323 8944 4621 0.56%
srdsub 2214 3424 1210 0.22% 2254 3484 1230 0.22%
Other 5353 - 0.34% 5192 - 0.32%
HardScope 28829 77421 43239 4.9% 29071 78723 44461 4.9%total
aCalculations based on uninstrumented CoreMark validation run (1578757 cycles).
bCalculations based on uninstrumented CoreMark performance run (1581062 cycles).
Table 5: HardScope performance overhead for different num-
bers of CoreMark iterations measured on Xilinx Zynq-7020
ZedBoard. Ticks indicate the number of timer ticks measured.
CoreMark CoreMark
(uninstrumented) (instrumented)
Iterations # ticks # ticks overhead
1 458187 472754 3.18%
100 45794484 47241900 3.16%
200 91580195 94473345 3.16%
500 228948574 236179862 3.16%
1000 457906316 472369922 3.16%
Average per 457905 472370 3.15%iteration
execution context. This can be achieved by applying HardScope
instrumentation at a finer granularity (Section 6.2). Instrumentation
at a finer granularity increases the number of required HardScope
context switches, but may provide a net benefit if the distribution of
context switches is such that the asynchronous SRS cache update
cycles are distributed over a larger portion of machine instructions
without causing stalls. Such instrumentation optimization also has
the benefit of being adjustable to the performance, and memory
access profiles of individual programs without requiring changes to
the hardware configuration.
H PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION
As discussed in Section 5.3, HardScope context switch instructions
sbent and sbxit require at most 𝑁 additional cycles to transfer
the topmost frame between stack and cache in both directions. This
implies that the processor must stall if another context switching
instruction is encountered within these 𝑁 cycles. One way to im-
prove the performance at no additional area cost, is to overclock
the stack at a frequency higher than that of the processor, i.e., if
the processor’s operation frequency is 𝑥 then the stack operation
frequency can be set at 2𝑛𝑥, where 1 < 𝑛 ⩽ 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑁 . This would
effectively reduce the number of stall cycles to 𝑁 /2𝑛. Note that
this comes at the cost of increased power consumption and might
not be feasible if the processor is already operating at a high clock
frequency.
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